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On the evening of the 17th of December, 1964, a Union Pacific local
freight, with 40 cars of wheat behind two diesel units, crept slowly down
Spanish Hollow, northbound from Kent to The Dalles, in north central
Oregon. The flanges of the boxcars squealed on the sharp curves; the
engineer tended the brakes carefully on the 3.47 percent grade that terminated
at the main line along the Columbia River. The train had gone up early
that morning—the two GP9s working hard to take 39 empties and a car of
diesel fuel up the grade. The train approached the main line at the foot
of the grade; the switches were opened; the last boxcar and the caboose
swung across the switch, and the train gained speed on the 17-mile run
down the main line to The Dalles. No member of the crew, no one in the
towns in which the train had been gathering the cars of grain, ever thought
for a moment that never again would a freight train come down Spanish Hollow
1
out of Sherman County.
The primary purpose of this paper is to consider the effects that the
ending of service had upon the economy of Sherman County.
The line involved was the Union Pacific's branch extending from Biggs,
on the main Omaha-Portland line 17 miles east of The Dalles, 52 miles to
Kent, and, prior to 1943, an additional 17 miles to Shaniko. The line
served Sherman County, and, prior to the 1943 abandonment, the southern
portion of Wasco County. Study was also made of a second line twenty miles to the
This introductory paragraph is somewhat apocryphal in detail but
not in substance.

-2-
west , the Great Southern, extending south from The Dalles 41 miles to
Dufur and Friend.
THE COLUMBIA SOUTHERN, LATER THE UNION PACIFIC'S SHANIKO-GRASS VALLEY BRANCH
1
Settlement of the Area
The Columbia River directly east of the Cascades is located in a relatively
deep gorge. The land to the south rises abruptly to an elevation of 1,000
feet, and then continues to rise more gradually to approximately 3,600 feet
on the Shaniko plateau, 75 miles to the south. Beyond Shaniko, the land
falls precipitously 1,500 feet to the valleys of the Deschutes and the
Crooked Rivers and their tributaries. The portion just south of the
Columbia is deeply eroded by narrow canyons, and cut by two major rivers,
the Deschutes and the John Day. These two rivers are, like the Columbia,
cut deeply into gorges, in most areas inaccessible from the plateau above.
There are only two crossings of the Deschutes between its mouth and central
Oregon (Sherar*s and Maupin) . The area to become Sherman County was that
located between these two rivers. The pioneers avoided this rough, nearly *_.„<=-
less, and barren country, and headed for the more congenial Willamette Valley.
Ultimately a major immigrant route crossed the area, swinging south from
the mouth of the John Day River and crossing the Deschutes at Sherars Bridge,
headed for the Barlow road around the south side of Mt. Hood—but no
immigrants tarried. A few settlers came in the late 1860s, primarily
grazing cattle, but not until the late 1870s and early 1880s was the area
actually settled, after the discovery that the hills would grow wheat
satisfactorily if cultivated only in alternate years.
The best history of the area is The Golden Land: A History of Sherman
County
,
by Giles French (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1958).
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Wheat production began about 1880, but not until the coming of the
Oregon Railway and Navigation line (later Union Pacific) in 1882 along the
Columbia did it develop on a large scale. By 1885 the output in the
county was 1.5 million bushels. But the wheat had to be hauled by wagon
down the steep grades to the Columbia—from as far south as Kent,
requiring three or four days. The John Day and the Deschutes,
to put it mildly, are not navigable. In 1889, the settlers sought a
county of their own, and Sherman County was created out of Wasco County,
consisting of the area bounded by the Columbia, the Deschutes, and the
John Day. Despite strong efforts to extend the county all the way to
Crook on the south, it was cut off just below Grass Valley; later the
boundary was pushed farther south, but to this day Wasco cuts below it to
meet Jefferson. The village of Moro was chosen as the county seat,
although Wasco was the larger town, as the voters of Grass Valley preferred
a county seat farther south.
The Building of the Railroad
The settlers of Sherman County were faced with two major concerns.
One was the land title situation; alternate sections in a six-mile strip
had been granted by the Federal government to The Dalles Military Road
Company in 1870, which in turn sold it in 1876 to a San Francisco firm, the
Eastern Oregon Land Company. Primarily this grant affected the southern
part of the county. There was dispute over land titles, and the Land Company
sought prices that the farmers, who were renting the land, regarded as
intolerable. Not until the 1930s was the land situation entirely cleared
up. The second was the lack of a railroad, which limited grain production
and made travel laborious.
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After various false starts, on March 4, 1897, the Columbia Southern
Railroad Company was chartered to build a railroad from the Columbia River
via Sherman County to Prineville and other points in central Oregon. The CS
was initiated by E. E. Lytle of The Dalles. Lytle was associated with the Oregon
Railway and Navigation Company (Union Pacific) , and the road had Union
Pacific financial assistance, but he operated with considerable autonomy.
The line was started in June of 1897 at a point named Biggs on the
OR and N (Union Pacific) main line at the foot of Spanish Hollow,
and was completed as follows:
Wasco October 6, 1897
Moro January 15, 1899
Grass Valley March 27, 1900
Shaniko May 13, 1900
Moro provided $5,000, Grass Valley $1,000 toward construction.
The road immediately established passenger and freight service,
the passenger train connecting with the day trains to and from Portland,
making the run down to the Columbia in the morning, ui in the afternoon
(Figure 4). In 1902, it carried 29,080 passengers—about 40 passengers
each way daily. The line was cheaply built—as was typical of most branch
lines in the west in the period—no ballast, minimum of grading, 56 pound
rail laid without tie plates. But it was soon handling a substantial
volume of traffic, not only for Sherman County, but for the vast area to
the south, for which it was the nearest railhead. Passenger and freight
traffic to Prineville—the metropolis of all central Oregon in the period
—
was carried by the railroad. It is reported that for the next two decades
Shaniko—itself capable of generating little traffic in anything—became
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the largest shipping point for wool in the United States, produced in the
vast area to the south.
As noted, the original plans called for extension of the line to
Prineville, and for a d ecade there were many announcements that con-
struction would soon start* And there appears little doubt that the Lytle
management did wish to build south. But there was one great obstacle:
the 1,500 foot drop off south of Shaniko. The two alternative wagon routes,
the main one via Cow Canyon, the second via Antelope Canyon, were regarded
as among the most difficult roads to travel in the west. And there was
little logic in hauling all central Oregon freight up this 1,500 foot grade
and then back down to the Columbia over a rail line not well built at best.
Suddenly, in 1905, Lytle resigned as president—-probably forced out by the
Harriman interests of the Union Pacific— and the following year all CS
directors were replaced by Union Pacific officials; in July, 1906, the
Columbia Southern was leased by the OR and N and in December. 1910,
purchased by the Oregon - Washington Railway and Navigation Company,
successor to the OR and N. Thenceforth it was operated as an integral
part of the Union Pacific, which absorbed the 0-W January 1, 1936. To
this day, however, this line is referred to in the area as the Columbia
Southern. Complete Union Pacific domination involved the end of the plans
to build south; by now the Union Pacific had decided that if It were to
build into central Oregon it would do so via the Deschutes canyon, to
avoid the grades of the Shaniko route.
Meanwhile, operations continued much as before on the line. The shops
were built in Shaniko, the town being created by the railroad and sale of

-6-
lots promoted. The other four towns on the line had all existed prior to
the building of the railroad; the circuity of the line was, in part, a
product of the desire to reach these four towns.
In 1909 occurred a chain of events that was in the end to play a
major role in the demise of the Shan ike line. In view of the prospect
of lumber development in central Oregon, both the Union Pacific and the
Hill interests (Great Northern, Northern Pacific) build lines southward
from the Columbia down the gorge of the Deschutes, the Hill line—the
Oregon Trunk—on the west bank, the Union Pacific on the east bank. When
the lines reached Metolius,an agreement was reached to avoid further
duplication and a single line was built into Bend; ultimately all duplication
was ended and both roads used one track (most of it being the Oregon Trunk's
line). The effect of the construction was a temporary boom on the Shaniko
line hauling materials for the new road, but after operations opened to
Bend in 1912, the new lines took all of the central Oregon traffic—freight,
passenger, mail, express. The Shaniko line now became strictly a dead-end
local branch. The new lines were of little benefit to Sherman County (except
for tax revenue on the UP line) ; because of inaccessibility they might as
well have been in the Fiji Islands. A few farmers did haul wheat to a
loading station at Sherar's Bridge, down a steep and rocky grade.
Changes in Operation
The loss of the through traffic and the limited population of Sherman
County soon brought the end of separate passenger train operation, and the
daily train became a mixed train, handling freight and passengers. Then
came the motor vehicle to eliminate most of the passenger traffic. To
facilitate mail, express, and LCL freight traffic, operations were shifted
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from day to night, and for a number of years, as shown on Figure 5, a
connection vas made at Biggs (aroui. . 3 AM ) with the night train from
Portland. The two lines to the east— the Condon and Heppner
branches—were operated in similar fashion. By 1930 the train was going
only to Grass Valley except four days a week; by 1934 all service on the
line was tri-weekly; in 1936 the train became a "freight train" carrying
passengers on irregular schedule, as shown in Figure 5. Also in 1936 the
UP contracted with a truck line to haul the mail, express, and LCL traffic
and bus service handled passengers. In 1940, service became only bi-weekly-
and by 1942 the UP passenger timetable no longer showed the trains. Two
passengers were carried in 1940, eight in 1941.
Apart from the loss of the LCL traffic, the rail traffic remained
relatively constant, as shown in Table I
—
primarily wheat outbound, with
some cattle; coal, petroleum products, feed, fertilizer, and farm machinery
items inbound. Already most livestock and wood were moving by truck. But
by the end of the thirties, with the worst of the depression over, there
was little thought that the UP might consider abandoning the line.
The Abandonment Application
On June 6, 1942, completely unexpectedly, the Union Pacific applied to
the Interstate Commerce Commission to abandon the line, and indicated that
the track had been requisitioned by the Metals Reserve Corporation (a
Federal agency) ac the request of the War Production Board to provide
rails and equipment for defense purposes. It was generally believed- in
the area that the idea to abandon was not the UP's, but the WPB's—that
someone in Washington had looked at a map ? seen, that this line appeared to
be very close co the Deschutes canyon line, and decided that it was an

Figure 5
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TABLE I
DATA RELATING TO THE SHANIKO LIKE PRIOR TO 1942
A. Traffic, 1941:
Commodity
Wheat
Livestock
Coal
Petroleum Products
Miscellaneous
Cars
904
73
29
64
120
Total 1,190 or 44,051 tons
B. Net Revenue, 1941:
Revenue attributable to the line, on and off the branch $131,191
Expenses of operation of the line:
Maintenance of way 48,218
Maintenance of equipment 3,084
Transportation 22,770
Miscellaneous 26,203
Total 100,275
Expenses, handling traffic off the branch, on operating
ratio basis 63,934
Taxes 14,297
Net Deficit 37,569
C. Traffic and deficits over preceding years:
Year Cars Deficit or Profit"
+ 31,905
+ 20,250
+ 24,217
- 11,480
- 21,322
na
Using the I. C. C. formula for determining expenses of handling the
traffic off the branch.
1937 1,785
1938 1,530
1939 1,683
1940 1,337
1941 1,190
1942, 6 mos. 539
SOURCE: I. C. C. FD 13780
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ideal candidate to release steel, and the IIP simply went along. Another
version is _hat the UP was pressure by WPB to offer lines to free steel—
and concluded that this was one of their weaker ones. The Union Pacific's
president, Jeffers, played a key role in the defense production hierarchy.
Regardless of where the idea originated, the Union Pacific pressed the
case—which immediately brought protests from the shippers, the communities
served, labor, and other groups. Hearings were held. The Union Pacific's
case was essentially that the line was of marginal profitability at best;
that some traffic was being lost to trucks; that some bridges needed
rebuilding; and that the line had been requisitioned anyway.
As of 1942, 37 miles of track were laid with 90 pound rail (entirely
adequate for branch line service), 31 miles with the original 56 pound rail,
all on the southern end of the line. The road was replacing 5 percent of
the ties annually; the UP granted that there was no deferred maintenance,
except for the need to rebuild three bridges. The line was being operated
with a steam locomotive, a Consolidation^with tractive power of 43,305
tons, weight 189,000 pounds, that was kept in The Dalles and used only for
che Shaniko line (typically four days a week). Given the grades, the
locomotive could move 700 tons northbound, 345 tons southbound,, or about 12
loaded cars. About 10 hours were required for the southbound trip, eight
hours for the northbound; thus the train took two days to make the round
trip. A crew of six men was utilized. In addition to the crew, there weio
nine' maintenance of way employees and four station agents (Wasco, Moro,
Grass Valley, Shaniko).
A wheel arrangement of 2-8-0, with low drivers, designed for low
speed freight operation with steep grades.
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The Union Pacific estimated the salvage to be $221,000 for the rail,
$8,450 for the land.
In its application the Union i .icif ic stressed three basic arguments:
1. The losses of the last two years.
2. The requisition of the rail for defense purposes.
3. The fact that trucks were handling some grain, and could handle more
The application led to strong and united protest from all parts of the
county— the three cooperatives and other groups. Money was raised to send
three community leaders to Washington to fight the abandonment. The
protectants stressed several elements:
1. The line had been showing a profit consistently until 1941; the
trouble currently was temporary, caused by the loss of export wheat markets
resulting from the war.
2. Virtually all the grain continued to move out by rail—an estimated
97 percent.
3. There were no suitable alternatives for moving the grain out.
4. The wheat rates had been reduced drastically by the UP to dis-
courage truck and water movements, and were far below the maximum figures
prescribed. For example, the rate from Shaniko had been 25 cents in the
1920s; it was now 12V cents. With higher rates, the road would show a
profit.
Division 4 of the Commission recommended against any abandonment, on
the basis of the arguments of the protestants. Meanwhile the Metals
Corporation released its hold on the rails; there had been too much national
outcry and pressure from influential legislators, including Oregon's
Senator Charles McNary, against the policy. The case was appealed to the
entire commission, and on July 26, 1943, it reached its decision: the
portion south of Kent offered too little traffic to warrant continuation;
only the elevator and warehouse at Shaniko were served, and only the
elevator operator protested. Thi ">n, with its light 56 pound
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rail, was in the poorest condition and the source of the deficit.
The wool from the area was already being trucked. The
Commission concluded that the remainder could be operated at a profit and
that the large volume of wheat being shipped could net be handled by trucks.
The shippers at Shaniko persuaded che Commission to defer the effective
date from July to November 30, 1943 to*allov the elevator to move out
the wheat, and as of that date the southern portion was abandoned and the
rails pulled up. The Union Pacific did not protest the decision and pro-
ceeded over the next several years to make some improvements to the line.
1943-1964
For the next twenty-two years, operation of the line-—now called the
Grass Valley line—and traffic changed very little. The old Consolidation
went the way of all steam locomotives in the period and was replaced by
diesels; by using two in multiple, it was possible to increase the load
materially, and with the line shortened to Grass Valley it was now possible
to make the round trip in one sixteen-hour day. Service was no longer
scheduled, trains being operated \ ten traffic warranted, but in practice
this meant from once or twice a week. One of the great advantages of grain
traffic is that high frequency is not required. It is highly important
to move the grain in quantity when the shippers wish to ship—but no need
to provide daily operation, as with much manufactured goods traffic- There
was no further talk of abandonment; the Union Pacific was apparently satis-
fied with continued operation of the line.
The Fatal Day
The area directly south of the Columbia River has long been subject to
flooding. Sudden summer cloudbursts are not uncommon in this low rainfall a*
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the canyons coning down to the Columbia are steep and narrow and water
can rise very rapidly in them. (3y contrast, the Deschutes never varies
significantly.) In 1903 a summer flood devastated much of the area and
wiped out the town of Heppner, killing 200 persons out of less than 1,000
population. The Grass Valley line had always been subject to some flood
problems, most of them not serious.
In December of 1964, cold weather came early, and in the week of the
15th, froze the ground, which lacked snow cover. Next came a 12-inch snow-
unusually heavy for an area that does not get much snow, Then on the 20th
and 21st the temperature went up into the mid-fifties and the rain began.
Five inches of rain fell—half the normal annual total—on the snow, under
which lay frozen ground, unable to absorb moisture." The result was
disaster on the night of the 22nu-~23rd J The business districts of Wasco
and Moro were under water, all communications were out, and roads blocked.
The creeks went high out of their banks, pouring flood waters down the
steep canyons. One of the most serious casualties was the railroad line.
When the rain and flood subsided, a heliocopter was used to survey the line,
Stretches of railroad had vanished—rails, ties and grade—and in places
there was no evidence that there had ever been a railroad.
Initially it was presumed that the line would be rebuilt; but within
a month there were rumors that the line would not be rebuilt, or noi. above
Hay Canyon. The UP commenced to salvage rails, ties, and bridge timbers.
Then late in January came a second and almost as severe flood—taking away
«
most of the salvaged items.
Since records had been kept in Moro, beginning in 1912 % never before
had there been two days in a row with a total of more than one inch of rain
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Forty-four freight cars had been left stranded, many loaded with wheat.
A train had started from The Dalles on the 21st but hed been stopped before
it turned up Spanish Hollow. In March these cars were removed by truck,
the bodies being lifted by crane off of the wheels after the grain was emptied.
The elevators commenced to move some grain by truck. On April 21, 1965
Union Pacific President Bailey wrote Sherman County Extension Agent
Thomas W. Thompson that the railroad was not certain about rebuilding but was
making aerial surveys. The Sherman Cooperative sought an answer in May
but did not get one—except that there would be no service in 1965. The
Sherman County Journal, in an editorial written by Giles French, the long-
time editor and writer, commented on the good relations with the UP and
hoped that the line would be rebuilt. But on July 13, the railroad announced
that it would petition to abandon—and in turn was sharply criticized
editorially by French. In a letter to Thompson in August, the road
explained that the cost of rebuilding was excessive, given the traffic.
On August 2 the petition to abandon was filed. Hearings were held at
The Dalles in the week of January, ^966, and on June 9, 1966, the examiner
filed his report recommending abandonment, which was approved by the
Commission.
Background to Abandonment Evaluation; Sherman County Agriculture
Analysis of the abandonment and its consequences requires some review
of the nature of agriculture in Sherman County. The county has a land area
of 531,000 acres, of which 55 percent is tillable, the highest in the
state; the state-wide average is only 8 percent. It is the only county
in Oregon to have no timber. The soil is productive but lacking in
organic material; the thickness of soil and the quality are best in the
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north and much poorer in the south. The rainfall, which averages eleven
inches for :he county, varies from ifteen inches in parts of the north
to ten in parts of the south. The result is that south of Kent and into
southern Wasco County, the yields are low, and substantial areas are not
tilled, being used only for grazing. Almost none of the land is level,
ranging from barely tillable slopes (or ones not tillable at all in some
of the canyons) to gentle ones, especially in the Grass Valley area. The
elevation ranges from 185 feet at the Columbia to 3,600 feet near Kent.
It was discovered in the 1880s that these dry hills could produce wheat
effectively only on a summer fallow basis. Each field is tilled only
every other year, being allowed to lie fallow after being cultivated in
the alternate years. This builds up both moisture and nitrogen content
and reduces weeds (but aggravates wind and water erosion)
.
Agricultural output is shown in Table II.
Traditionally, from the 1880s the county has produced wheat—soft
white winter wheat, sown in the late fall, harvested in midsummer. The
wheat moves almost entirely to Portland for export to the Far East (Japan,
India, etc.). This type of wheat is used primarily for cracker and pastry
flour, and, in the Far East, for noodles. At one time considerable hay
was grown, mostly to feed horses, and some is still produced. A major
change was the sharp increase in production of barley between 1950 and
1970. But this change was a product primarily of Federal crop allocation
programs, and as noted later, the trend has reversed. Much of the barley
goes to the Willamette valley and to California for livestock feed, and
some is exported. Total agricultural acreage has barely changed at all
over the years; from 1950 to 1970 the acreage of wheat fell and that of barley
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rose, but wheat output continued to rise up to I960, and then fell. The
increasing total output of grain is attributed to improved varieties (about
half) and to Increased use of fertilizer and weed control techniques, and
better timing of planting and harvesting, with greater mechanization. The
wheat yields per acre over the years are shown in Table III, but these
figures are somewhat misleading because of intra-county differences. The
yield currently varies from 60 or more in a few places in the north in the Wasco
area to 10 in a few areas south of Kent, but 36 is typical of the principal
areas
.
While output value of crops has risen, the number of farms has continued
to fall; the total has fallen from 545 in 1900 to 209 in 1970. Thus the
average size has risen; the data show an average of 2,650 acres, including
range land, but 1,500 is a more typical figure for crop land. Only half of
the land is farmed each year, of course. There is a substantial amount of
absentee ownership, some farms being operated by owners of adjacent farms,
some by strictly tenant farmers. A peculiarity of the farms of Sherman County
is that the farmhouses are almost never visible from the roads; the latter
follow the ridges, the. farmhouses built in hollows to avoid the winds and
be close to water.
The decline in the number of farms and mechanization of agriculture
have of course resulted in decline in population of the county; the 1970
population, 2,139, is just half of that of 1910—4,242. The effect of the
smaller farm population on the towns has been little, short of disastrous.
The population figures for the towns and for the county are given below in
Table IV; Shaniko is included although it is in Wasco County.

TABLE III
YIELD PER BUSHEL, WHEAT, SHERMAN COUNTY, SELECTED YEARS
Year
1926 19.6
1936 18.3
1946 26.6
1956 32.6
1964 35.8
SOURCE: I. C. C. FD 23761

TABLE IV
POPULATION, SHERMAN COUNTY, 1890-1970
Population
Year
Mcro Wasco Grass Valley Kent Sherman
County
Shaniko
1890 na na
1900 335 322
1910 378 386
1920 418 701
1930 352 400
1935
1940 309 303
1945
1950 359 305
1955
1960 327 348
1964 339 57 7
1970 290 412
na
na
342
317
208
204
195
234
216
153
na 1,792
15 3,477
125 4,242
161 3,826
94 2,978
94 2,321
125 2,271
65
50
,446
2,139
495
124
100
55
61
39
SOURCE: U. S. Census Volumes
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Wasco has always been the largest town, but had fallen to 400
—
compared to a peak of 700. A temporary increase in the late sixties
resulted from the construction of the John Day dam on the Columbia. Moro,
the county seat, is now down to 290—and much of this population is due
to its status as county seat.
The Elevators and the Handling of Grain
As of 1964, the grain elevators in the county, all cooperatives, were
as follows:
Sherman County Grain Growers Association, with headquarters in Wasco:
Two elevators, plus those at Biggs and Rufus on the UP main
line along the Columbia:
Capacity
Wasco 685,000 bu.
Klondike 876,000
Moro Grain Growers Association, headquarters in Moro:
Hay Canyon 1,001,000
DeMoss 373,000
Moro 680,000
Erakine 150,000
Grass Valley Grain Growers Association, headquarters in Grass Valley:
Grass Valley 1,380,000
Bourbon 200,000
Kent 792,000
Eakin Cooperative: 114,000
Total, on rail line 6,251,000
Shaniko 358,000
Total 6,609,000
SOURCE: I. C. C. FD 23761
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There were a total of 11 elevators and 33 grain warehouses (including
Shaniko , f^ora which as of 1964 gra a was trucked to Fant for shipment).
The warehouses were in part carryovers from the earlier days of sacked
grain, but a number were, still in use. They were located alongside the
elevators, plus additional ones in Nish and. Wilcox, which did not have
elevators. The estimated investment in the elevators was $3,115,000.
Some were modern poured concrete elevators; others, rectangular buildings.
The wheat was virtually all shipped to Portland for export. The
elevators shipped wheat exclusively by rail—as they had since the line was
built. Not all of the grain moved out of the county by rail, however:
1. A limited amount was fed to livestock locally.
2. A portion was trucked at harvest time or out of farm storage to
The Dalles for shipment by water to Portland. The farm storage capacity
in Sherman Count:/ was about one million bushels.
3. A portion of the barley was trucked to the Willamette, valley, Central
Oregon, or California for livestock feed.
For the crop years 1962-63 and 1963-64, and the rive-year average,
the transport pattern for wheat and barley combined was as follows:
Output,
Carloads
Rail Shipments
from
the County
% by
Rail
1962-63 2,270 l s 652 72
1963-64 2,365 1,833 7S
1959-64 aver.age 2,195 1,796 82
SOURCE: I. C. C. FD 23761
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While the increase in barley production had resulted in some relative
3hift to trucks, there had been no l ignif leant diversion of wheat to
trucks or decline in wheat output; the predictions of 1942 of increased
truck transport had not been realized. The number of cars for two periods
are listed below: figures for tne intermediate years are not available;
Carloads of
Years Grain Shipped
1937 1,800
1938 1,230
1939 1 } 380
1940 1,030
1941 904
1959 1,803
1960 2,235
1961 1,895
1962 1,327
1963 2,260
1964, 1,341
SOURCE: I. C. C. Finance Docket 23761. The figures for years prior to
1940 involve a slight degree of estimation.
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Thus there was no visible trend; the highest year was 1963. The
year-to-year fluctuation reflected jhe variations in crop yield, the
timing of the shipments in terms of the calendar year, and, probably,
the relative rail and barge rates, which changed during the period.
The increased production of barley, much of which was trucked, was offset
by the increasing yield of wheat acreage.
During the 1960s the railroads in the northwest made several
efforts to reduce rates to compete more effectively with barges.
In 1963 (Grain from Idaho „ Oregon and Washington to Ports in
Oregon and Washington
, 319 ICC 534), the I.C.C. denied most of the
requests on the grounds that the proposed rail rates were less than
fully distributed cost while barges were the low cost carriers.
In 1966 (325 ICC 358), the I.C.C. approved the lower rates "on the
basis that they would not destroy barge competition.
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The country elevators on the line do not buy the grain; they simply
store for tae farmer and assist him in the sale. The sale is made to
the exporters in Portlands technically, directly by the farmer. The same
is true of grain trucked to the Interior elevator in The Dalles. The price
received by the farmer is the Portland export price less transport and
handling costs. Since these elevators are cooperatives , their net earnings
are distributed among the farmers on a patronage basis,
As would be expected from the elevator capacity rather than from popula-
tion, Grass Valley was the largest shipping point on the line } followed
closely (for bushels) by Hay Canyon, which has no population at all, with
a substantial distribution throughout
t
TABLE VI
SHIPMENTS FROM ELEVATORS
Shipping Point
Miles from
9.7
Average Shipments,
Millions of bushels,
1955-64
Average Number
of Cars Shipped
1959-63
Cars
shirv-
1963
Wasco 32 .
6
301 369
Klondike 14.2 29.2 208 290
Hay Canyon 19.0 33.1 283 325
DeMoss 23.9 9.S 90 96
Moro 27.0 24 .
2
243 303
Erskine 31.1 5.6 50 50
Grass Valley 38.5 34.7 357 489
Eakin 43.0 4.1 39 58
Bourbon 45.8 5.1 52 52
Kent 52.5 22.8 245 297
SOURCE: I. C. C. Finance Docket 23761.
"Cargill does buy grain in The Dalles
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Inbound Traf fic
Primarily and to an increasing extent over the years, the traffic on the
line was outbound grain. There was no outtreight but grain—in contrast to
the picture as late as 1941, when 73 cars of livestock were taken, out; this
traffic had gone entirely to trucks.
The total number of inbound loaded cars had been as follows:
1941 213
1959 84
1960 87
1961 37
1962 34
1963 43
1964 36
A breakdown by major category is available 1959-64, as presented in
Table VII:
TABLE VII
INBOUND TRAFFIC, 1939-64
CARLOADS
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Agricultural implements 21 12 10 6 10 7
Feed 4 8 8 8 14 11
Dry fertilizer 1 2
Anhydrous ammonia (fertilizer) 41 39 7 8 7 8
Petroleum products 7 8 Q 7 8 6
Other 10 18 3 5 4 4
Total 84 87 37 34 43 36
SOURCE: I. C. C, FD 23761
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The sharp decline from 1941 had primarily been in the handling of petroleum;
in 1941 all gasoline and diesel fuex came in by rail; in the 1960s, only a
few cars of diesel fuel for Union Oil at Grass Valley. The big drop after
1960, when the traffic fell in half, was the loss to trucks of the handling
of anhydrous ammonia, the principal fertilizer used. This is trucked from
Portland or Pasco. The loss in petroleum traffic was a national phenomenon
as the petroleum industry shifted from rail to truck partly
because of the desire to deliver directly to service stations instead of
through bulk plants. The extreme unbalance in traffic (characteristic
of most branch lines) resulted in the need to bring in large numbers of
empty boxcars. The wheat was all handled in boxcars, typically with 60 ton
loading; the use of 100 ton hopper cars had not yet begun on any scale in
1964.
Total Traffic
The volume of traffic, calculated in terms of the major points, is
slightly short of the volume prescribed in the 1974 D, 0. T. report as
necessary for a line to be included in the proposed CONRAIL system, but
well above the minimum volume regarded by D. 0. T. as necessary if a line,
is to be retained on a subsidy basis. The 1959-64 average was barely
above the I.C.C. *a 34 car rule; traffic below this figure is presumptive
evidence for abandonment.
Table VIII shows ton mileage per mile of line for each segment;
the overall average 1959-63 is 61,219 ton miles per mile of line.
in 1973.
1
The shift occurred on traffic to Prineville in central Oregon only

TABU VIII
TON MILES PER MILE OF LINE, 1959-63 AVERAGE AND 1963
Miles,
Segment
Kent - Bourbon
Bourbon - Eakin
Eakin - Grass Valley
Grass Valley - Erskine
Erskine - Moro
Moro - DeMoss
DeMoss - Kay Canyon
Hay Canyon ~ Klondike
Klondike - Wasco
Wasco - Biggs
Total ton miles
Average ton miles per
mile of line
Ton Miles per Mile
1959-63
Average 1963
6.7 14,700 17,820
2.8 17,820 20,940
4.5 20,160 24,420
7.4 43,080 54,900
4.1 46,080 57,900
_* . i_ 6.1,560 76,800
4.9 66,960 82,560
4.8 83,940 102,060
4.5 96,420 119,460
9.7 115,380 142,380
3,249,620 4,011,130
S "J *1,219 75.683
SOURCE; Calculated from tonnage data
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The Line
A more detailed statement of tae nature of the l^.ne is required as
preliminary to discussion of the damage done to it in the 1964 flood. As
of 1964, trie line was 52,5 miles in length, with used 90 pound rail
laid in 1919-23 and in 1951 (on the southern portion, to replace the 56
pound rail), and a small amount of 130 pound rail. The line was unballasted
and only partially tie plated. The first portion of the line, from the
junction at Biggs to a siding called Thornberry, was by far the most diffi-
cult, the line coming up the side of Spanish Hollow on a 3.47 percent grade.
The canyon is narrow and the. grade was cut into the bank 15 to 20 feet
above water level. (The creek has little or no water most of the year.)
From Thornberry the grade and curvature was reduced as the hollow widened.
The track bisected the town of Wasco, the station located on the main
street. Then, instead of heading southwest, toward Moro, as does the highway,
the line continued southeast to make a great loop; the rail mileage Wasco -
Moro was 17.2 miles, the highway milt-age 9. The track climbed steadily on
a 2.28 percent ruling grade thro -en country to Klondike , where
a major elevator was located; Klondike once had a store and a population of
7; there is now only a house. The climb continued to Sandon: and then followed
a two percent down grade —the ruling grade against northbound traffic --into
the mouth of Hay Canyon where the latter is joined by Grass Valley canyon.
On a spur off the line down into the canyon was located the big Kay Canyon
1
The line was routed via Hay Canyon, despite the grade against the
loaded traffic, in part because of efforts of Hay Canyon area farmer? to
obtain service. The Hay Canyon area was regarded as one of the best wheat
areas in the county in the nineties. Some swing to the east was required
to avoid the ridge above Wasco.
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elevator. Then the line began to climb again, following; the narrow canyon
1
of Grass Valley Creek on a two per. ait grade to DeMos • Springs and Mora,
entering the latter on the east side of the business district. The line
then followed Barnum Creek southwest past the elevator at Erskine. This was the
end of the canyon running; from thence on southward the line followed the
undulating hills, with a 2.2 percent ruling grade to Grass Valley, 1.68 on
to Kent. In summary, there were 19 miles of one to two percent ascending
grade (southbound), nine miles from two to three percent, four over three (all in
Spanish Hollow). There were four miles of descending grade southbound between
one and two percent, 2? miles from two to three percent . The remaining
13 miles had grade under one percent, as the line ran along the ridges of
the hills above Moro. There were 45 bridges, one a 67 foot girder bridge,
most short trestles. There were 165 curves, over three per mile, the
sharpest 16 degress. The elevations of the towns were as follows:
Biggs 170 feet
Wasco 1,266
Klondike 1,547
Hay Canyon 1 , 2SS
DeMos s 1,567
Moro 1,798
Grass Valley 2,271
Kent 2,797
Shaniko, the original terminal, was at 3,330 feet.
Despite the lack of ballast, the line in general had been maintained
in good condition for the volume of traffic, as is typical of Union Pacific
lines. Good drainage minimized maintenance problems.
DeMoss was once a town with houses, stores, churches, etc.
Today there is no trace of the town—only the elevator and a roadside park,
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The Earnings
The Union Pacific's calculation of earnings for 1963 and 1964
were as follows:
Revenue 1963 1964
Freight revenue arising from
the line:
traffic originating on
the line $ 387,546 $ 226,125
traffic terminating on
the line 18,550 12,507
Other revenue 1,369 1,530
Total revenue 407,465 240,162
81,920 60,330
4,648 2,998
49,934 34,929
Expenses
On the branch:
maintenance of way
maintenance of equipment
transportation
Total operating expenses 136,502 98,257
Other expenses
Taxes
Equipment rental
Miscellaneous
Total other expenses
Total expenses on the branch
Expenses of handling on the
main line the traffic originating
or terminating
on the branch:
using UP operating ratio
using ICC 50% rule
Total expenses, using
UP operating ratio
ICC 50% rule
Net Income
,
Using UP operating ratio
Using ICC 50% rule
Source: I.C.C. FD 23761
16,587 16,655
7,440 4,827
4,855 4,710
28,892 26,182
65,394 124,449
210,266 130,913
165,091 97,782
375,660 255,262
330,490 222,231
31,805 15,100 def.
76,975 17,931
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The expenses and net profit or loss figures were calculated in two ways, the first
using the Union Pacific *s own operating ratio to determine the expenses of
handling the traffic off the branch, the second the l.C.C.'s 50 percent figure;
that is, one half of the revenue is assumed to be required to cover the out-
of-pocket expenses of handling the traffic off of the branch. The net earnings
with the two approaches, for the years 1959-1964, are indicated below:
Net, Union Pacific
Year Operating Ratio Basis Net
r
I.C.C . 50% Rule
1959 + 11,379 + 50,390
1960 + 86,370 +134,330
1961 - 5,749 + 31,578
1962 - 47,775 - 20,915
1963 + 31,805 + 76,975
1964 - 15,100 + 17,931
SOURCE: I. C. C. FD 23761
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On the T. C. C. formula, the branch was doing remarkably well—compared
to most; even on the UP's basis the overall record was not bad. These
figures, oi course, do not include return on investment. Cost of operation
on the line was 4.1 cents (1963) per ton mile.
Train Operations
With the elimination of the line south of Kent and the dieselization,
it became possible to make the run i:o Kent and back within 16 hours, and
the overnight stopover was eliminated. In the 1960s the train was operated
on call only, rather than on schedule—that is, when traffic warranted.
In practice this meant an average of nearly two trains a week; in 1963, 95
trains were operated, of which 86 went south of Moro; in 1964, with lighter
traffic, 70 trains, of which 61 went beyond Moro. Under a peculiar feature
of the union agreement, Moro was designated as a terminal. If a train went
south of Moro, this was an additional trip. Therefore a round trip from
The Dalles to Kent involved two days pay (but of course required nearly
16 hours as a rule). A six man crew was utilized.
Of these trains, in 1963, 59 utilized two engines and 36, one; in
1964 the figures were 37 and 33, Tne diesels used on the lines were GP 7s
or 9s, or F 7s or 9s. The 9s could pull 525 tons, or 21 empties, up the
ruling grade in Spanish Hollow; the 7s, 15. The 9s could bring I 3 000 gross
tons or 11 loaded cars up the two percent grade from Hay Canyon to Sandon.
Thus 22 cars were the most that could be brought out from points south of
Klondike. In 1964, agents were still being employed at Wasco, Moro and
Grass Valley; in that year all except the Moro agency were closed.
The Rate S tructure
The rate structure was basically different from that affecting most
traffic on branch lines, a feature significant for the effects of abandonment
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The rates varied with the distance from the Columbia
Biggs, on the main line
Wasco
Klond ike
Hay Canyon, DeMoss, Moro
Erskine, Grass Valley
Eakin, Bourbon, Kent
Cents per
cwt
Cent
Ton
2.2
:s per
Mile
L3 2.3
14 2.4
14i 2.2 (Moro)
15* 2,2 (Grass Valley)
16£ 2.1 (Kent)
Miles from
_
Portland
104
14
18
122; 128; 131
>; 143
147; 150; 157
SOURCE: I. C. C. FD 23761
Thus rates per ton mile were approximately the same, to all points,
including Biggs on the main line. These are relatively low rates Cor the
distances involved; as noted, in the 1920s the rates were twice as high.
Incoming freight coming over longer distances was subject to blanket rates;
the rate to points on the branch were the same as to main line points in
the area.
The Abandonment Decision
The written and oral testimony on the abandonment application were
very detailed and contain extensive information on the line.
The Union Pacific built Its case around the flood damage and the
amount of money required to rebuild the line.
The primary damage was in two sections:
1. Milepost (the junction at Biggs) to milepost 4.75 near Thornberry
—
the section in Spanish Hollow. Most of this line had been torn out completely-
rails, ties, roadbed, bridges, and grade were gone; there was hardly any
trace of the railroad at all.
2. Milepost 19 at Hay Canyon to milepost 26 near Moro. In this section
Grass Valley Creek had done similar damage, taking out. the grade as well as
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track and bridges. The Union Pacific's chief engineer stated that this was
the worst damage he had ever seen o„ a Union Pacific line.
In total 81 miles of line were destroyed, and 24 of the 26 bridges on
these two segments-. Some damage was done to other portions, but this was
relatively minor. Tae Union Pacific made its own estimate of the cost to
rebuild and had a separate estimate made by an engineering firm. The
Union Pacific's figure was $1,615,000 as a minimum to rebuild at the same
elevation as before. Of this, the Spanish Hollow section would account for
$930,000. The engineering firm's estimate was $2,294,000. But to rebuild
on the old grade level was regarded as folly because of the danger of
repetition of the flood. The problem in Spanish Hollow has been aggravated
by the rebuilding of Highway 97 , which had reduced the space available for
the creek. To build on a ten foot higher grade would impair the clearances
of the highway overpasses; to rebuild the highway bridges would cost anoth
$1.5 million. To make matters worse, immediately following the flood,
U. S. 97 was rebuilt in such a way as to encroach still further on the
canyon and even the railroad right of way.
The Union Pacific argued that the potential earnings from the line did
not justify this amount of outlay, and given the nature of the area, there
was no possibility of increase in traffic. On the I. C. C. formula the
earnings had averaged $48,000 per year over the preceding five years; the
length of time necessary to recover the investment, 22 years, was regard^
as excessively long. The railroad argued, further, that the traffic could
be handled adequately by truck—and used as evidence the fact that the 1965
A case could be made that the state could appropriately bear this
cost, since its action in widening the road grade had aggravated the damage
to the railroad.
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crop had been handled successfully—though admittedly the crop was less
than normal. The Union Pacific was of course also aware of the
growing importance of farm storage, now estimated at one million bushels
capacity in the county, and the tendency to truck from farm storage directly
to The Dalles for water transport . While the tonnage, thus moved had not
seriously affected traffic on the line thus far, the potential was great.
The gain to the Union Pacific from retention of the line was of course
less than it might otherwise have been because of the relatively short
main line haul and the relatively low rates. The long period the UP
took to come to the conclusion not to rebuild probably reflected differences
of opinion among various persons in the company involved in the decision.
The prctestants included the grain cooperat Lfic Northwest
Grain and Grain Products Association, an organization of grain cooperatives;
the U. S. Department of Agriculture; the Oregon Public Utilities Commission;
local groups; and, as always, the labor unions.
However y was less united than in 1942. The management of the
Moro Cooperative had long believed that trucking of grain to the Columbia
and thence shipment by water offered advantages; the manager was a director
of North Pacific Gi ain Growers Association, which was encouraging water
transport. Accordingly the Moro Cooperative, while opposing the abandonment
did not fully join in gbt, which was, reported, primarily a
Wasco effort. The task was also more difficult; there was no war omergencyj
trucks were more readily available; and there was some feeling that t
task was hopeless, given the vashout.
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The basic arguments centered around several points:
1. T^e cooperatives had continued to use ra.il sarvice almost
exclusively; the traffic -eased over the years.
2. The line was noL unprofitable by the Union Pacific's own figures,
the investment would be recovered in time, and the railroad had entirely
adequate funds with which to rebuild
.
3. The costs of rebuilding to the old standards were overstated.
4. Substantial injury would result to the cooperatives and the
farmers of the area in several ways:
a. Cost of transport.
(1) The costs of handling grain would be increased; the combined truck
and rail rate would be higher than the old rail rate even with the rate
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concessions made by the Union Pacific. The combined rail actor rates as
compared With the old rail rates £ ates woul as folic
• Cents per Cvt
Shipping Point All Rail Rate, 1964 Rail-Motor Combined Rate
Wasco 13 17
Klondike 14 17i
Hay Creek 144- 18
Moro 14i 18i
Grass Valley 15* 21
Kent 16* 23
The total cost additional pe ir was estimated no be $91,725.
This analysis assumed that: the traffic would move truck-rail, whereas the
truck-barge rate was lower,
(2) Additional costs of rehandiing at the Columbia, estimated at
$75,41
(3) The elevators would require readjustments to facilitate shipping
of grain out by truck rather than rail on other than a temporary basis.
One estimate of cost was $162,137,
(4) New facilities would be ed on the Columbia River for tran-
shipment by water or rail, estimated cost of $94,000.
(5) Surfacing of roads to elevators not having such roads, $105,000.
Thus a total capital outlay of $361,137 would be required, and additional
annual costs of $167,136.
b. There would be incidental disadvantages to the farmers and the
cooperatives, centered around the loss of "orderly marketing'."
(1) The elevators might lose their certification

(2) Payment to the farmers would be delayed, since drafts could not be
drawn on the grain until it was loaded into railway cars.
(3) There would be less certainty about rates and transport costs;
no longer would there be a posted rail price.
(4) Concern was expressed about the availability of motor transport
as required for immediate delivery of grain sold in large volume., and
year-round availability. Some elevators would occasionally move as much
as ten cars in one day.
(5) Competition between rail and motor transport for moving the grain
would be lost.
(6) Farm storage would increase, lessening the need f '~>r the country
elevators.
(7) Some inconvenience would occur in obtaining I s, which
were based on on-rail prices.
The net effect would be loss in convenience of shipping; loss in the
value of the elevators, which would play a less important role in
handling; and reduced net return to the farmer-; due to higher transport
costs.
One is impressed by the high quality ciefs and the testimony,
with a minimum of the usual irrelevant nonsense that, is o f resented in
such cases.
The Effects of Abandonmen
t
1_ Grain
As soon as it became apparent that the line could not be back in service
for the year of 1965, the elevators commenced to move the grain by truck
to the Columbia. The Union Pacific, in an effort to lessen the problems
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of the shippers and the opposition to abandonment lowered the rate f rorc
Biggs on motor-rail shipments from xl cents per 100 pounds to 8£ cents. But
much of the grain went by barge on the Columbia. Even so the total
costs were higher at the moment; for about one million bushels of C.C.C. grain,
the additional costs resulting from trucking were estimated to be $24,702,
or 2.3 cents per bushel. The Union Pacific then lowered the rate again,
to 7 cents on combined shipments and about 700 cars moved out by rail,
about one- third of the figure previously moving.
Once it became evident that the line would not be rebuilt, more
permanent stex>s were taken
:
Moro and Grass Valley: MIDCO; Early in 1966, Moro Grain Growers
Association built a new elevator on the Columbia River at Biggs (it had no
elevator at this point previously), to permit barge loading and trucked
all grain from its country elevators to this river elevator for shipment
by barge to Portland. e elevator has a capacity of only 220,000 bushels;
the wheat is stored in the country elevators and then moved to the river
when particular amounts are accumulate for a barge load. A barge
holds 50,000 bushels, the eqt boxcars* and can be loaded in
11 hours. The wheat is all handle.': in bulk and thus loaded and unloaded
mechanically.
The Grass Valley Cooperative at first built a temporary rail loading
facility at Biggs and trucked to that point. Shortly it began to ship
through the Moro facility. On June 1, 197 3, the Moro and Grass Valley
cooperatives were merged to form MIDCO (Mid Columbia) Grain Growers Association,
with headquarters in Moro. Currently MIDCO has one truck and trailer of its
own, holding 26 tons, and contracts for the use of two additional trucks
and trailers as needed to meet peak demands; it cannot keep more than one
truck busy at all times.

MIDCO's own truck e about 10 percent less than the contract
rates. The costs (1974) are shown .n Table IX;
COSTS OF SHIPPING GRAIN TO PORTLAND FROM MIDCO ELEVATORS, 1974
RATE PER 100 POUNDS
Origin
Contract
Truck Rate
9 . 25
Cc
Own Truck
(approx.)
Barge Rate
Biggs-Portland
Total..
Rate
17.45
1964
All Rail
Rate
Kent 8.3 8.2 1 6 .
5
CrasiJ Valley 6.5 8.2 .,1 15.5
Moro 4.8 .3 8.2 13.0 14.5
Hay Canyon 4.3 3.6 8.2 12.5 14.5
With Contract trucks
SOURCE: Provided by MIDCO Grain Growers Association
Thus, except for Kent, the tot \1 cost of shipment is less now by
truck-water than it was by rail. For Moro, for example, in terms of bushels,
the truck-barge figure is 7.8 cents; truck and rail, 9.2 cents; the old all
rail rate, 8.7 cents. Only for Kent, with its relatively long trucking
haul, is the overall cost higher. The trucking costs per ton mile are as
follows: Kent, 3.6; Grass Valley, 3.3; Moro, 3.6; Kay Canyon, 4.5, using
the -rail mileage. Using the road mileage (which is shorter), the figures
are: Kent, 4.6; Grass Valley, -4.8; Moro, 5.6; Kay Canyon, 5.4. These truck
costs are higher than the rail rate differentials under the all rail rates;
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it is the lower barge rate that makes the combined figure lower. The
cooperative did add some investment, at the river elevator, in other
elevators, and for the purchase of a truck, to offset this dif ferential
in part.
In summary, then, essentially the abandonment of the line prodded Moro Grain
Growers into doing what it could have done anyway and might have done ultimately.
For an outlay of perhaps $300,000 in total—or an annual cos.: of perhaps
$18,000 at 1964 interest rates—the effect was to save, on all traffic
except from Kent, a considerable sum of money
—
perh>- i the average 1/2 cent
per bushel, on 3 million bushels, or $150,000 annually.
Sherman Cooperative: The Sherman Cooperative followed quite a differ-
ent policy. Sherman already owned an elevator at Biggs m the river, which
handled the grain from its members relatively close to the river. This
elevator had once been located on the river itself; when the Jo y dam
was built, the Sherman directors thought that there was danger of the elevator
being flooded, so the Army Corps of Engineers moved it inland across the
Union Pacific tracks, leaving it only r ad truck access. Interstate 80
is now also between it and the river. :: ps ei f by rail,
bringing the wheat f ls Wasco ai :ce elevators by truck. Its
truck and rail costs are as foJ
Origin
Cont r a c t True
k
per 100 lbs.
Rate, Ra
Rate
11
LI
Combined
te
64 All
Rail Rate
Wasco
Klondike
3.3
4.2
14.3
15.2
13
1-
The truck costs are somewhat higher than the rail costs per ton mile
of operating the branch, exclusive of return on investment.
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In terms of bushels: the rail rate to Portland is 6.6 cents; the
truck rate, 2 cents from Wasco, 2£ cents from Klondike. The comparison with
the previous all rail rate is somewhat misleading because of the increases
in rail rates that have occurred generally since 1964; with the. rate
reductions made by the Union Pacific in 1965 (since offset by general rate
increases) the cost of the combined truck-rail movement was not greater than-
the previous all rail movement. The net result of using rail, however, is
that a somewhat greater cost is being incurred at present than the truck-
water cost; but the cooperative estimates that the differential over
water, all elements considered, is not over i cent a bushel. This is not
regarded as serious and the Sherman Cooperative is satisfied with the
present transport system. The Cooperative does not own its own trucks
but contracts for this work. When grain is being shipped from Biggs and Rufus,
five miles east, the cars are dropped off in the early morning by the local freigh;.
that works the Condon branch and picked up loaded in the late afternoon. All
shipments now go in hopper cars, C3 and C4, handling 4,000 bushels. These
eliminate the need for grain doors and the leakage through holes. The
Sherman attitude is that if there was access to water the cooperative would
ship by both rail and barge, but the gains from shifting to barge do not
warrant the investment necessary to do so.
Thus, as the situation now stands, the grain handling in Sherman County
is roughly as follows:
1. The largest portion of grain, that coming from MIDCO, is trucked
to Biggs and moves to Portland by water.
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2. A second segment, perhaps 750 cars a year on the average, is
trucked to Biggs and Rufus and moved by rail to Portland.
3. A third segment, perhaps as much as one million bushels per year,
is trucked to The Dalles for direct water shipment, through Interior
Elevators, which leases the large river elevators from the Port of
The Dalles, or through Cargill. Some of this grain comes down at harvest
in farm trucks (perhaps 5 percent). Most of it is hauled out of farm
storage by commercial truckers. Interior also receives grain by truck
from farm storage in central Oregon, from the portion of Washington directly
north of the Columbia, and by truck and rail from eastern Oregon and
Washington and Idaho, and by rail from Montana and the Dakotas.
4. Some barley is trucked to the Willamette valley for livestock
feed and seme to California at low back haul rates; it cannot move by truck
in competition with rail at regular truck costs or rates.
It should be noted that little or no grain is trucked to Portland tor export or
for flour milling. There are two reasons: the much higher cost of trucking
than the cost by barge and the existing rail rates, combined with the
unsuitability of handling wheat as a back haul; and the very limited
facilities for dumping of trucked wheat for export at Portland. The flour
mills in general do not handle grain or flour by truck in the northwest; the grain
comes in by rail, is milled, and goes out again by rail on transit rates.
The net effect, therefore, of abandonment on the major crop of the area
was in fact negligible and in a way was beneficial by prodding Moro (now MIDCO) to
build an elevator at the river. Grain acreage was about the same
in 1973 as In 1960. The crop on the whole moves at rates that do nor.
differ sharply from those that would exist if the rail line were
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stlll in place; any differential, some favorable (Moro), some slightly
unfavorable (Kent, and Wasco-Klondi^e) is not significant, given present
prices for wheat. Some additional investment by Moro and a small amount
by Sherman was required, but this also was relatively small. But the
failure of the abandonment to have significant results for the particular
crop was due to several special circumstances:
1. The availability of cheap water transport, more or less equally
suitable, for the purpose.
2. The effect of water transport in keeping rail rates relatively low.
3. The relatively short distance the wheat, moves—not over 150 miles
—
coupled with the nature of the railroad rate structure on the line, the
rates rising with distance from Portland. Had s single blanket rate
applied to the whole area, the shippers from southern Sherman County would
have been seriously affected by having to absorb the trucking costs.
4. The cheapness of transferring grain from truck to barge or rail
car mechanically.
Had these conditions not been present, the economic injury to the area
in the form of higher transport costs would have been substantial.
Evidence of lack of effect is provided in Table II; agricultural
acreage has risen since the abandonment. The recent shift back to wheat from
barley reflects the end of allotments and relative cost-price ratios.
The fears of the shippers about the nonavailability of trucks, the.
effects on the roads, and the loss of "orderly marketing" proved to be
illusory. Admittedly it was simpler to fill the grain cars at the elevators.
But the cooperatives have been successful in moving the grain to the river
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by truck without trouble; grain is moved first from elevators such as Klondike
before the rural roads are affected by the weather. But an additional outlay
of $184,000 proved to be necessary on the county roads. 1 Additional road
maintenance cost is hard to estimate. The major highway, U.S. 97, is built to
high standards and carries long distance trucking. It is nor congested ana
negative externalities from trucking are minor, limited to the loss of time
to motorists who get caught behind grain trucks on the curves.
If, however, the export markets were lost and the wheat began to move
east by rail, the loss of the line would prove to be more serious. Even so,
the grain can now be trucked to the UP main line at little or no greater
real cost than the previous rail movement—but the shippers would lose the
advantage of blanket rates which would likely apply to all points in central
Oregon, as do the rates on lumber.
Grain from Maupin and Madras elevators, which take in grain from southern Wasco
County and a limited amount from Sherman County, moves by rail out of the
elevators to Portland, as a cost roughly the same as the combined truck-
barge rate would be. It could move equally well either way. A substantial
amount of grain from farm storage in the Madras-Maupin area is trucked to
The Dalles for direct shipment by water, rather than moving through the
elevators and by rail. Wheat from the Condon area directly east, east of the
John Day River, moves primarily by rail but some from farm storage into
Arlington by truck and some through the MIDCO elevator at Biggs. Thus, if
the Grass Valley line were still in place, most of the Sherman County grain
would likely still move by rail; there is little difference In cost between
the two methods.
Letter from Sherman County Road Department, July 16, 1974.
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The Effects: Inbound Traffic
As noted, the inbound traffic had dwindled to the point at which it
constituted only about two percent of total traffic Gasoline had already
transferred to trucks, and the remaining diesei fuel traffic of
Union Oil was easily transferred* In more recent years this traffic has
been shifted even at points still having rail service in central Oregon
(e.g., Prineville) . The same happened with the fertilizer traffic. The
inbound feed traffic was affected to some extent. For example, MIDCO
averages about Is cars a month from the Ralston Purina mill in Spokane.
This has to be trucked from the Columbia River rail points with, in the
past, somewhat higher total cost; larger trucks now make it possible to
truck directly from Spokane at less than the old rail rates. But on the
whole, consequences for inbound traffic were nominal; the total coming in
was small anyway, and the major items had shifted to trucks—as would not
have occurred with fertilizer if it had been, dry fertilizer blended in the
county.
Unlike in many abandonment cases, there was no complaint of poor service
causing loss of traffic; shippers were well satisfied with the Union
Pacific's service.
Incidental Adverse Effects on the Area
It is difficult to discover significant adverse effects of the
abandonment. Somewhat fewer men are employed loading freight cars—but this
change would have occurred anyway as the traffic shifted to hopper cars,
as it would have in the late sixties. The loss of other railroad personnel
—
four agents, the nine section workers and their families, added to the
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decline in population and buying in the area; these apparently wore <•
offset by ^n equivalent increase ir the trucking industry. There was,
of course, some increase in employment in trucking, purchases by trucking
employees who live in the county, and purchases of motor fuel and supplies.
The jurisdiction lost about $9,000 in taxes (but other Oregon jarisdictions
received larger amounts; the total tax bill of the Union Pacific was undoubtedly
not reduced by this amount, given the methods of valuing railroad property for
tax purposes in Oregon) . The newspaper lost the advertising that the
Union Pacific does in the areas it serves—and the crew no longer ate lunch
in the county. There has been, probably, some adverse psychological effect;
the loss of the railroad was one more step in the long decline of the towns
in the county. As noted above, the towns have lost population for decades
—
and even persons most loyal to their home county can hardly call
their towns appealing. Kent (like Shaniko) has almost achieved ghost town
status and Grass Valley is scarcely a viable economic unit, its population
down to less than 150. Moro and Wasco do have a few attractive homes, a
few cafes, gas stations, small sto es, plus the elevators; Moro has a
weekly newspaper anc a bank, which Wasco lacks. But Moro is supported
primarily by the fact, that it is the county seat. Both towns have numerous
boarded up store buildings, with more vacant lots than houses in many blocks.
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The loss of the railroad, as indicated, is just one more symbol of
1
economic d cline and t ss :lim lates any hope future industrial
development that requires rail service. But one cannot help but feel that
the chances of such development were slight. Some persons did have a
certain sentimental attachment to the line—sometimes referred to as "Old
Sage Brush Annie 5 '—long the area's lifeline to the outside world.
The loss of the railroad to Shaniko in 1943 was, while inevitable,
more significant; eventually the elevator and warehouse were abandoned, the
grain moving from the farms or farm storage either to Maupin, on the main
railway line down the Deschutes, to Kent, or all the way to the Columbia
by truck. for water transport, Shaniko lost its economic significance when
the Deschutes line was built: it gradually deteriorated, and the ending of
the rail line was the final blow. It is essenti a ghost town— in fact,
attempts have been made by the few residents to capitalize on this as a
tourist attraction. There are few more desolate spots in Oregon than the
Shaniko plateau and it is bard to lure an • purpose. The old
brick. Columbia Southern Hotel, famoi in the earlier days, sti ands,
as do the abandoned warehouse and elevator— lot much else.
Was the Abandonment Juscl
t
iable ?
The 1942 application to abandon the entire ?£> as noted,
prompted by considerations other than strict profit maximization—was
clearly unwarranted, and the I. C. C. r s decision rejecting it was economically
Ironically, Sherman County has one of the highest per capita incomes of
the Oregon counties. The farmers do well-—but the towns do not.
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correct. The line, by the Union Pacific's own figures, had been earning
up until 1940, when the war interfered with export markets, an average of
$26,000 a year, over the period 1937-39. This figure, of course, involves
some arbitrary determination of costs of handling the branch line traffic
on the main line. The salvage value was estimated to be $230,000; the
eld steam locomotive at the maximum was worth $2.t>>000. Thus annual
earnings of only $15,300 (at 6 percent) were required for the line to cover
all of its economic costs, and the actual earnings were well in excess of
this. But the Kent-3haniko portion was without doubt offering inadequate
traffic to warrant continued operation, although exact figures are not
available. The 17 miles of line served only the one elevator at Shaniko,
which in turn served only about 25 farmers. The possibility of trucking
to Maupin and Kent, though at some higher cost, made retention of the
segment unwarranted, especially since Shaniko offered no future traffic
potential.
As of ''QSA, the situation as t the remaining line is more difficult
to assess.
If it is assumed that irrent picture remains unchanged, so
that the time factor can be eliminated, the basic formula for evaluating the
desirability of retention of a railroad line, from the standpoint of the
railroad is as follows:
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G = (R. + R ) - (C, + C )
rs d s b s
where: G = net gain to the railway system . The line will be retained if
G is posit iv.
rs *
R, = revenue arising from operations on the branch
b
R additional revenue to the remainder of the system due to
s
traffic originating or terminating on the branch that will
be lost if the branch is abandoned
.
C, = costs due to the operation of the branch that will be eliminated
b
if the branch is abandoned, including an interest return on
the salvage value of the line and equipment used.
C - costs to the system of handling the branch-created traffic
off of the branch (costs that will be eliminated if the branch
Is discontinued). This is difficult to ascertain; the I. C. Ca-
uses a 50 percent rule— that half of the revenue received from
this traffic represents out-of-pocket cost of moving it on
the main lines.
If this formula is ap{ results are as follows. The
net gain for the five-year period 1959-63 v 3,000 a year before return on
salvage value is considered. The Union Pacific's estimate of salvage value after
costs of removal was $206,000. The two diesels on the line were worth
perhaps $400,000; if 40 percent of this is assigned to the line, the
figure is $160,000, and the total relevant investment $366,000. Thus return
at six percent on the entire salvage value was $22,000. Continued operation
was clearly warranted
—
prior to the flood damage. The minimum estimate of
the cost of rebuilding was $1,615,000. This sum plus the salvage value
of $366,000 would have provided a base of $1,918,000; at six percent, annual
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earnings of $119,000 would hav€ red to an actual figure
of $48,000 Thus. G . sre figure of $7]
rs
Thus the necessary earnings—at 'ic's figure of
costs and expenditures—exceed the e, Lgs of the previous years by about
$70,000 a year. There was no expectation that evenue could, increase
significantly. The grain traffic ban remained steady for several decades,
apart from year-to-year fluctuations, increasing crop yield being offset by
greater barley output (much of which was trucked) and by more trucking out
of farm storage. It did not appear that either of these trends would be
reversed, and there was always the danger that more would move by the
truck-water route. Much of the inbound traffic had been lost to trucks,
and there appeared to be no chance of increase. This traffic had never
been significant at best. Thus, given the lack of expectations of improve-
ments in revenue the company was clearly justified in not rebuilding,
even though it had adequate funds to do so.
From the standpoint of society as a whole, however, the abandonment
decision equation must be modified retention is justified if G is
N
positive, with the equation
5 » [(R. + R ) - (C + C )] + Sh + N + Dr 4- E;w d s s sys
in which: G » net gain ciety
Sh - "shadow price?' adjustment: adjustment cf costs to reflect
the difference between real economic costs and costs
actually incurred.
N
sys
= net COtttri&ution of traffic created by the line to the
national railroad system as a whole.
Dr
- additional amounts shippers would be willing to pay, over
existing rates, to keep the line in operation.
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Ex = value of external to persons other than those
actually us he line.
In this case, these items are as follows:
Sh; The costs of train operation ^ere higher than necessary
because a six-nan crew was used; four men. were clearly
adequate for efficient operation. The difference was perhaps
$8,000 a year,
N : Since very little of the traffic (a few inbound cars) moved
sys
over lines other than the Union Pacific, this figure was
negligible.
Dr: While the elevators were anxious to keep the rail line,
clearly they were willing to pay very little more to do so-
given the avail.? y of other forms of transport.
Ex: Externalities. Given the other i'leraf in the equation,
externalities of a value of $ 63 per year would have been
required to justify continued operation of the line.
G = -71,000 + 8,000 + + + Sx
Ex - 63,000 if G *
The principal externality to the area as a whole was that of keeping
the wheat trucks off the highways, The gain from this is difficult to
quantify, but value judgments suggest that the negative externalities from
the grain trucks are not very significant. Thus, the only justification
would have been the overall prestige externality of avoiding one more
blow to an area that in some ways was declining, and retention of the line
for possible future industrial development or in the event of change
the direction of traffic flow of wheat. But the possibility of
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subsidization or of the county taking over the line (which it could have
purchased /or salvage value or ever less}"1 was certainly not seriously
considered and apparently net dered at all (despite the example
provided by Prineville, 100 miles to the south, with its long and
successful operation of a railroad). Lue judgments of persons in
the county were obviously the same as the author's: that subsidization
out of tax revenue of >ssibly more—was simply not
warrantee, given the alternative uransport forms available.
The Union Pacific, might have given trie county the line if it were
to be kept in operation.
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THE C; RAILROAD
To th, vest or n County s 3 County, wh .nee covered all
eastern Oregon and parts at is now Id gradually carved down to
its present size. -ore diverse county than Sherman* some
portions much more fertij watered' er portions covered with
forest* sti ! I other segments, near the Deschutes, resembling Sherman. The
county seat is a major commercial and transport center for
central and eastern Oregon,
Building oi. .Iroad
Around the turn of the century 5 several plans developed for building
a railroad south frcr* The D2l1.es, but not until L904 was construct.,
actually undertaken. The immediate aim was Dufur, 15 miles south
The Dalles by road, center of a a atural area, primarily wheat.
A secondary objective u?as the timber of Mi ^ood Nat ?est
of Dufur. There g into ce egon,
but tne great obs and id tc the Deschutes
were discouraging fsctors, ar .l building of the :hutes !Uver line
put an end to this Lo Dufur, November 30*
1905. tn 1912-13 the village of Friend, in
the tim . ntry between Tygh valley of Fifteen Mile
Greek. The line was built by John Heiiarich,
,
who had made a fortune
in Colorado minrng and moved to the it, making investments in a
number of fields, B run by his son John, Jr. and the rail-
road from the beginning to end was almost synonymous with John Ke
To avoid the hills south of The Dalles which the stagecoach road and
TEodern highways crossed, the railroad followed Fiftee on its
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long circuitous path to r, swinging far to the east* close to but high above the
Deschutes } between rough and jumbled hills far taore tortuous than those of
Sherman County. The rail mileage to Dufur was thirty, twice the road mileage.
When the extension was built to Friend, the line left the valley and
climbed steadily up the ridg. theast of Fifteen Mile Creek, from about
1,000 feet at Dufur to 2,500 feet. The shops were originally located in
Dufur, and the daily train came down to The Dalles in the morning, back
in the evening. Later the shops were moved to The Dalles. Regular passenger
service ended in 1928 with the end of the mail contract. The grading was
limited; new 60 pound rail was used, with little ballast. The cost was
about $585,000.
In addition to Dufur and Friend, there were several small villages on
the line, Petersburg, Wrentham, Emerson, and Boyds being the most important,
with grain elevators and warehouses. Only Dufur remained a town of any
magnitude; population is indicated below:
1900 336
1910 523
1920 i33
1930 382
1940 392
1950 422
1960 488
493
The principal elevators and source of traffic were at Dufur. From begin-
ning to end the primary traffic was wheat, although in time some lumber
and log shipments were carried. A small lumber mill was built at
Friend. The hope of the period around 1900 that the area would become a
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major fruic producer failed; rainfall was inadequate and in time the vast
orchards w re torn out. The north rn fringe of the county produces large
quantities of sweet cherries, but not in the area the railroad served.
Traffic, revenues, expenses, and profits for selected years are show
in Table X.
Financial Difficult
In the earlier years the road did reasonably well; it did not cover
interest in most years, but the bonds were held primarily by the stock-
holders. After 1921, however, tonnage and the passenger traffic and
revenues commenced to fall as trucks and cars took over the merchandise
traffic and the passenger business. With the elimination of passenger
train service, the road was able to restore operating profits, but unable
to cover property taxes, on which it commenced to default in L926.
hope always Lay in greater traffic, and in Heimrich c< ied a
contract with the Forest Service for the cutting of two billion board feet
of timber in the Mt. Rood National Forest, and construction was started on
a lumber mill on the line and the T%iion Pa e miles east of The Dalles.
The logs would be brought down by rail. Before the mill was finished, lumber
prices fell; the mill was left unfinished (and became a dance hail), and
Heimrich eventually lost bis Forest Service contract, despite the effor
of The Dalles Chamber of Commerce to save it. The railroad struggled on,
but a series of unfavorable events were to destroy it. The physical con-
dition of the road deterio I and service became unreliable; the farmers,
desperately hard pressed by low wheat prices, began to truck their wheat
to The Dalles for shipment by water. In 1932 the road carried only one-third as
much wheat as in the previous year. For that year the ton mileage per mile

TABLE X
TRAFFIC AND REVENUE, GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD. SELECTED YEARS
Net Revenue
Operating Operating from Railway
Year Revenues Expenses Operation Net Income
1905-16 average $45,331 $24,096 $19,601
1921-30 average 52,207 15,257 $- 30,121
1921 97,909 59,351 31,577 - 21,051
1924 65,678 52,170 4,549 - 22,588
1925 39,321 53,547 -19,976 - 54,115
1926 42,168 28,892 5,938 - 28,277
1927 40,941 26,186 7,328 - 27,083
1929 33,093 18,686 4,916 - 5,09I
J"
1930 20,223 23,078 - 1,855 9 225
1931 16,008 9,942 6,066 2,294
1
1932 5,755 6,588 833 - 4,539
L
1933 7,974 10,064 - 2,110 - 3,728
i
1934 9,556 9,296 266 - 1,54s
1
1935-6 mos. 2,700 4,200 - 1,400 - 2.700
1
No interest paid
TONNAGE BY TYPE OF COMMODITY
Year Wheat Fruii Petroleum
1921 30,306
1924
1925
1930 12,078 114
1931 12,204 13
1932 3,875 144
1933 5,483 14 151
1934 6,739 107 38
Forest Products
2,477
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns - not reported separately
SOURCE: Interstate Commerce Commission, FD 10880
and Statistics of Railways, Annual
Total
34,039
26,381
12,856
12,849
12,440
4,051
5,674
6,895
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of line was only about 3,000— w figure. The track was so
bad that i_ was difficult tc rains on the traeK The road was soon
down to two employees, Reiitrich himself doing much of the work.
Further complications arose wl imrich's sister, Rose Bull, sued him for I
share of the father's estate; when John Heimrich, Sr. died in 1911 s he left
the estate in trust, with John. Jr. as executor for 15 years. Mrs. Hull's
suit was successful, and she received all of the stock in the railroad
and $800,000 of bonds. In November of 1932 it was announced that her
husband, S. A. Hull, a Portland lumber man, would take over the road, obtain
a new Forest Service contract, and build a box factory in The Dalles
—
meanwhile improving railroad. Some improvements wore actua tade and
on April 6, 1933, the new management announced the establishment of joint
rates with the Union Pacific, 1 2 grain rate to Portland to 13£
cents a hundred. In 1933 and 1934, operation was spasmodic, but grain was
moved out in larger quantities and { eum moved in.
But the line was also plagued by defaulted property taxes--now in
default S-i.nce 1926. In January, 932, the county brought suit to collect
$37,000 in unpaid taxes, and the County CouEt gave title to the county in
August, But the county made clear that it did not want to force the line to
suspen ted to insure that o i would c< ne. Concern was
expressed in The Dalies over inconvenience to the elevators from loss of
the line and about the fact that if the road were abandoned, the chances
of a lumber mill in The Dalles would be gi ' reduced. In June of 1933
after Hull had taken over, the county agreed to accept $5,814 for its
$34,000 tax lien. In October of 1933 at foreclosure suit, the road was
awarded to the bondholders—and the road was reorganized as The Dalles and
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Southern— I . in f: tnicality, as lo the bonds.
The attempts to get funds to rebuild the line and pay off the county
dragged on for two more years; the road operated occasionally to haul out:
wheat. An attempt to get an RFC loan failed in July of 1935 on the grounds
that the pro:: the road were too poor.
In that month, Hull indicated that he planned to junk the line and
applied for permission to do so. He argued that the line could not be
operated in its present .shape; the $50,000 to rehabilitate it could not be
raised; and that the line would not be profitable anyway. Accordingly , in
August, to prevent Hull from selling the line for junk, the county again
filed suit to foreclose. Following the granting of I. C. C. approval to
abandon (decided September 30, 1935), Hull announced that all service would
end April 30, 1936. Finally on August 13, 1936, the county agreed to
accept $35 j 134 from Hull to clear away the lien, having gi^en up all hope
that operation could continue, < l contractor began to scrap the line.
There were no protests for the request to abandon; the only initiaJ
objection c?tne from firms ser -p?*- lire in The Dalles that would be
left without Thi s track and deeded it
to the Union Pae
e Effect;
The immediate effects were not great. Much of the Dufur area wheat
was already being trucked directly to The Dalles. The elevators in Dufur
suffered some loss because trucking of grain fr he elevators was somewhat
more expensive than rail, but the di ice was not great. At about this
time the Dufur elevators collapsed and were rebuilt on higher ground away
from the railway right of way. The enterprise, a corporation but farmer-
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owned, continues to function as a commercial elevator, the grain trucked
primarily to Interior iiors ant Cargill in The Dalles for shipment
to Portland by barge. Grain from the Wrentham-Petersburg area all goes
directly to The Dalles, either at or out o rra storage. Between
Bufur and Tygh Ridge, about 40 percent goes into farm storage and thence
directly to The Dalles; about 60 percent into the Dufur elevator, In
southern Wasco County, beyond Tygh Ridge t some wheat goes directly to
The Dalles, the rest to the elevator on the rail line at Maupin (owned by
Interior Elevators) . The other elevators have ceased to be commercial
elevators; the ones at Rice and Emerson are used for farm storage by the
owners, while the one at Boyds is unused.
The significant effect of abandonment ? however, and one clearly fore-
-seen* was the effect upon the future location of lumber mills. The Dalles
did have a mill for a time, but it was abandoned after a few years, partly
because of problems of getting Ln. If the railway had stayed in
operation, the mills might have located In the Friend area or Dufur and
the lumber shippe" by the railroad, or in The Dalles, with the logs
shipped down by rail. ' [ood
-
imber cutting began,
mills were built in Tygh Valle; in Maupin, southeast of the timber
sources. Neither is an ideal location, Tygh Valley never has had a
railroad, and the 1 lumb ist be trucked 8 miles to a siding on
the Burlington Northern - OP line at Sherars. It is not possible to
obtain figures of the cost of this trucking, but the cost of loading and
The mill at Maupin burned in 1953 and was purchased and rebuilt by
the Mountain Fir Lumber Company of Independence* Oregon. Mountain Fir
purchased the Tygh Valley mill 60.
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unloading the truck. operating them is not negligible. It is reported
that the trsk requires one truck ai I driver full time The situation at
Maupin is little better. Maupin is located on the steep west bank of the
Deschutes, the railroad tracks at tb torn, the only leve] ground one
thousand feet, more or less, above. The site of the town itself is suitable
only for a training school for Rocky Mountain goats. The mill is of course
on the plateau above-, and the lumber must be trucked down the steep road to
the rail siding. The chips are ingeniously sent down through a pipe
directly into the freight cars 1,000 feet below.
If the Great Southern had not been abandoned, therefore, the mills
might have been located in a more optimal location and The Dalles
would have benefitted. But no thought was given in the 1930s to having
the city or county take over and operate the line to preserve it,
In general, the Great Southern was a victim of circumstances. Had
national recovery of the economy, with higher lumber prices, come sooner
>
the opening of lumber product! ve saved the line in all probability.
Had John Ht Lmrich not been so lily feuds and if he had dealt
somewhat differently with his shi] ? he might have been able to carry
the road through until recovery came. From the standpoint of agriculture,
the loss of the railroad was not ficaut; from the standpoint of
lumbering it clearly -.as-. Had nol inessmer. of The Dalles been
financially hamstrurg by the depr lures, an. organized
attempt might have been made to save the road.
'"Heimlich was basically a very wealthy man, but his assets were highly il-
liquid. Despite his wealth he spent ffuch of his time maintaining the
locomotives, But it is reported that he had an unfortunate tendency to
ury to squeeze too much out of 3cme of the shippers for too little in the
way of service.
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CON ONS
Study of the abandonment of tl \ Union Pacific's Shaniko line and i
the Great Southern suggests the following conclusions:
1. When water transport to the destination is within economical trucking
distance of the shipping points and the product can he transferred from
truck to barge ail mechanically, the abandonment of a railroad has
little effect on the industry—in this instance wheat production—formerly
dependent upon the line. The evidence in this study suggests that 50 miles,
roughly, is the breaking point for truck-barge operation before costs come
to exceed those of direct rail transport.
2. When rates on a line rise with distance, little harm is done to the
shippers at more distant points on the line by abandonment; with blanket rates
the distant point shippers enjoy an advantage under all-rail transport that
they cannot receive under other forms and suffer losses if the line-
abandoned .
3. If a product is hipped long distances, water transport
is not available, transfer from tr ck to rail is expensive, and rail
rates ^efle - >ng distance bulk traffic costs, loss of a branch line can
have significant, influence on location of plants and can result in higher
costs. This i. ity lumber production experience.
4. When the population of an agricultural area is relatively small,
and inbound shipmen feed and fertilizer are either minor or can move
by truck at little or no greater cost, the loss of the railroad line is not
of serious consequence from the standpoint of inputs of production. This was
certainly true of Sherman County.

-52-
5. The ability of the Union Pacific to operate its Sherman County
line with a more than adequate return on salvage value over a long
period of years with ton miles per mile of line between 60,000 and 70,000,
despite use: of a six-man crew and no deferral of maintenance, raises serious
doubts about the validity of the D. 0. T. figures used in the proposed
restructuring of the northeast railroads. This line would never have met
the requirements for inclusion in the proposed northeast system. One
favorable feature, not recognized in th& D, 0. T. proposal, is the fact that
bulk shipments of grain do not require daily service,
6. The extreme fluctuation of earnings from year to year, caused
primarily by the exact timing of the. sale of the crop (whether most of it
moves before or after January 1) demonstrates the serious objection to
evaluation of the viability of rail lines on the basis of data for any
one year.
7. The experience with the flood damage demonstrated vividly the differ-
ence between the earnin;?::> necessary to warrant continued ox>eration of a
line with existing i investment is required
to reconstruct portions a
8. when rates on a branch line increase with distance, as on this
line, the D. 0. T. type of formula for deter ig viability of a line is
completely unsatisfactory, based as it tpon the assumption
that the rate is the same to any point on the line.
9. With traffic at the levels of the Sherman County line, rail costs
per ton mile on the line itself are slightly lower than truck cost-; if
return on investment is not included, and about thi e it" return on
salvage value is included.
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